Major questions remain about the extent and political significance of white racial attitudes. In this paper we examine an alternative source of data on racial attitudesactual voting on the purely symbolic repeal of anti-miscegenation referenda. By applying cross-level (ecological) inference methods to this unique data, we find, surprisingly, that white voting behavior differs dramatically from what would be predicted based on previous survey research on public and private attitudes.
Introduction
Debates over white racial attitudes have been enduring, heated and often complex.
There is still no consensus over how much racial attitudes still matter in American politics. And there is even less consensus over the shape that these attitudes take and the relationship between these attitudes, policy preferences, and political behavior.
Over the last fifty years there have been immense changes in the racial attitudes of white Americans. A half-century ago, white Americans, in both the North and the South, openly expressed their racist beliefs and supported policies that reflected and reinforced such prejudices. Since then, however, such expressions of white racism have declined drastically. According to Schuman et al., "On questions concerning principles of equal treatment of blacks and whites in the major public spheres of life (jobs, schools, residential choice, public accommodations, transportation), there has been a strong and generally steady movement of white attitudes from denial to affirmation of equality-so much so that some questions have been dropped by survey organizations because answers were approaching 100 percent affirmation." (Schuman, et al. 1997, pg. 191) Yet for all these changes, the progress toward racial equality has been incomplete.
Decades after the civil rights victories of the 1950s and 1960s, American schools and neighborhoods remain highly segregated, and blacks still face persistent economic inequalities. 2 Much the same is true regarding white racial attitudes. Despite the decline in overt expressions of white racism, serious debate exists over the reasons for and significance of this fact. For some, contemporary racial attitudes reflect a genuine change in white hearts and minds. Some even conclude that white racism has declined to such a point that it no longer presents a significant barrier to black progress. In the words of Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, it is "simply wrong to suppose that the primary factor driving contemporary arguments over the politics of race is white racism."
(Sniderman and Piazza 1993, pg. 5).
Others, however, question both the genuineness and significance of changes in white racial attitudes. These analysts acknowledge that the "old racism," based upon biological notions of black inferiority has largely disappeared, but they claim that white attitudes regarding racial equality remain ambivalent or even hostile. For example, while most whites express strong support for racial equality in principle, support is much lower for most measures designed to achieve racial equality as a fact. These analysts also suggest that for reasons of social acceptability, many whites mask their true racial attitudes in public opinion surveys. They argue that a "new racism," based upon antiblack affect and a belief that blacks refuse to play by the same rules as other Americans, now exerts a powerful influence on whites attitudes toward a range of racial policies, including school desegregation, affirmative action, and social welfare spending.
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A substantial challenge for this argument has been the inherent difficulty of separating anti-black affect and policy position as explanations for survey responses. The ban on interracial marriage has the highest place in the white man's rank order of social segregation and discrimination. Sexual segregation is the most pervasive form of segregation, and the concern about `race purity' is, in a sense, basic. No other way of crossing the color line is so attended by the emotion commonly associated with violating a social taboo as intermarriage and extra-marital relations between a Negro man and a white woman. No excuse for other forms of social segregation and discrimination is so potent as the one that sociable relations on an equal basis between members of the two races may possibly lead to intermarriage. (Myrdal, 1964 While the GSS does not support breakdowns by state, regional data is revealing:
In the South Atlantic region, wherein South Carolina is located, 86.5 percent of whites (and 94.5% of non-whites) opposed laws barring interracial marriages. In the East South Central, wherein Alabama is located, opposition was a bit lower, at 69.8 percent (and 90.4% for non-whites). 7 This figure By examining the racial breakdown of the vote on these referenda, we can determine the extent to which these public opinion surveys accurately measure the racial attitudes of white respondents. In both South Carolina and Alabama, the measures passed with approximately equal levels of support, 61.9 percent and 59.5 percent, respectively.
Unfortunately, no exit polls were conducted to determine how blacks and whites voted on the issue. Nonetheless, the voting and election data from these states allows us to estimate such a breakdown. Both states identify the race of both registrants and voters, allowing us to determine the number of blacks and whites who voted in each precinct.
Furthermore, blacks and whites make up the overwhelming majority of voters in both states, making a racial breakdown easier to determine. According to the 2000 Census, 96.7 percent of South Carolina's population and 97.1 percent of Alabama's was categorized as either black or white.
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Data Collection
For both states, we collected data on the referenda results and the number of blacks and whites who voted in each precinct. For South Carolina, we obtained our data from the State Election Commission. 10 Of South Carolina's 2005 election precincts, 139
are for absentee, provisional, or other forms of non-polling place ballots in which it is impossible to determine the race of the voters. This leaves 1866 valid precincts in which we have election results and counts of the number of black and white voters. Four of these precincts appeared to have data entry errors, as turnout exceeded registration, which is logically impossible. We removed these outliers, leaving 1862 precincts. 11 These precincts account for roughly 95 percent of the total votes cast in the referendum.
Furthermore, the approval rate for the amendment was almost exactly the same in the valid precincts as in the sample. Thus, the valid precincts seem to adequately represent the overall behavior of South Carolina's voters. 12 For Alabama, the data were collected from a variety of sources. 
Inferring Individual Voting Behavior from Precinct Data
In order to compare survey behavior and voting behavior, one needs to infer the behavior of individual voters from aggregate election results. In this section we describe the details of these inference methods, often called "ecological" or "cross-level" methods.
Readers who are most concerned with our findings may wish to skim this section. Those who which to replicate or extend our analysis should read more closely.
The fundamental problem of cross-level inference, which is often called the "ecological fallacy", is that relations observed in aggregate data do not necessarily correspond to relationships among individual behaviors. For example, a correlation between the percentage of white population in a county, and the percentage of that county voting against the amendment does not necessarily imply that individual whites were more likely than non-whites to vote against the amendment. The "method of bounds" computes the logical bounds on individual behavior implied by the percentages for each aggregated unit. E.g., in a district that is 80 percent white, and in which only 10 percent of the voters voted for the constitutional revision, it is literally impossible that more than one-eighth of the whites in that precinct voted for the revision. For each precinct, we can calculate similar bounds for both whites and nonwhites. Unfortunately, these bounds are, in most cases, so wide as to be substantively uninformative.
"Homogenous Precinct" (HP) analysis involves looking at only those precincts
where the population is nearly uniform -e.g. nearly all white or all black. 14 HP is straightforward to apply, but it requires the existence of such uniform precincts in the data. Statistically, it discards the information contained in mixed precincts, and substitutes assumption that the behavior of each member of a group in a homogenous precinct is identical to the behavior of group members in heterogenous precincts.
"Ecological regression," which is also commonly known as "Goodman's regression" (Goodman 1953 Table 2 shows, these results reveal a wide gap between the attitudes of voters as expressed in the voting booth and as expressed both in. the GSS survey and in a special pre-election poll in Alabama: If voters were more likely than non-voters to support bans on interracial marriage then some of this difference could be explained by differences in the populations sampled. However, when we compared the opinions of likely voters in the GSS (those who voted in the previous presidential election) to the rest of the GSS population as a whole, we wound that likely voters (both overall, and in each of the relevant regions)
were (very slightly) more likely to oppose laws banning interracial marriage. 24 So, it appears that voters, in fact, expressed different attitudes in the voting booth than in the preceding surveys..
Distribution of the Vote Against Reform
Estimates of statewide proportions are, in this case, an oversimplification. As Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows, non-white behavior is more uniform than white behavior. In each precinct, the overwhelming majority of non-whites voted for reform. In contrast, white behavior varies more dramatically -whites in some precincts voted overwhelmingly against reform, while in other precincts white's voted overwhelmingly for it. White voting was not uniform across precincts, as Figure 1 and Figure 2 show.
For Alabama, we were also able to obtain sufficient information to match precincts to VTD's and thus map the geographic pattern of the white vote at the precinct level, as shown in Figure 3 . In general, the map seems to show somewhat higher levels of white "no" votes in the traditional Black Belt areas of the central and western part of the state. 
Correlates of the White Vote
Previous research suggests that white racism may be correlated with the level of minority concentration (the 'black threat'), urbanization, education, or age 25 . Like any practical statistical model, EI is sensitive to model specification. For example, EI allows one to introduce a (single) covariate for (each of) black and/or white voting, and the choice of covariates can be critical in correcting statistical problems in the data (King 1997, chapter 9). We introduced a number of covariates to explore whether controlling for other demographic factors related to the white vote reveals different voting
propensities.
In particular, we used demographic data from the U.S. Census decennial SF3 files to calculate, by county, the percentage of the county that is non-white, percentage urban, percentage of whites that had some attended college, and the percentage of population 65 years and older. 26 Reassuringly, the overall estimates of white and black vote (for and against each of the propositions) proved to be robust to the inclusion of each of these potential covariates.
To explore the relationship between white voting and these explanatory variables further, we use least-squares, weighted on the standard errors of the betas, to regress the effect of the explanatory variables on the EI estimates (this technique is known as EI-W). 27 An EI-W regression on these covariates yielded no convincing evidence of correlation: The fit of the EI-W model was not strong, indicating that these variables do not explain the pattern of white voting well, and the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables was substantively negligible.
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The analysis of Alabama did suggests that whites in more rural counties are more likely to vote 'No', and that whites in counties where the population is older, blacker or more educated are less likely to vote 'No'. The large negative coefficient on 'percentage old' is surprising, given the usual positive correlation between age and conservative racial views (Schuman et al 1997) (see Table 3 ). However, a great deal of caution is required in interpreting these results, as they are essentially driven by Jefferson County.
When Jefferson County is excluded, the model fit drops to negligible levels, the coefficients shrink by roughly two thirds, and the significance all but the intercept and "percent rural" vanish. That we did not find these explanatory variables to have had strong effects on the white vote is perhaps not surprising given the coarseness of the demographic data. Since fine-grained demographic data is not available, we can only conjecture that if demographic information were available for each precinct stronger relationships would emerge.
Discussion
As these results suggest, race was a somewhat more important factor in the Alabama vote than in South Carolina. In South Carolina, approximately 60 percent of whites supported repeal of the interracial marriage ban along with about 68 percent of blacks. In Alabama, however, whites split 50-50 on the referendum, compared to the nearly 90 percent support given by blacks. Astoundingly, the racial divided in voting is comparable in size to that found during the election contest between Edwin Edwards and David Duke, in Louisiana, more than a decade ago.
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The difference in support across the two states, particularly among black voters, is noteworthy. We posit two explanations. First, as the GSS results (described earlier)
suggest, voters in the South Atlantic region (which contains South Carolina) are somewhat more liberal than those in the East South Central region (which contains
Alabama. This explanation is undercut, however, by closer examination of the GSS analysis, which reveals only negligible differences in the attitudes of black respondents across these regions.
The second, and more likely, explanation for the difference between black votes in each state might be in the possibility of voter confusion or error on the referenda.
Since these referenda asked voters to ban a ban, the use of a double negative in the ballot language might have confused voters as to which vote was the most appropriate. The possibility of confusion was evident in South Carolina, where election officials included an explanation with the text of the referendum. In that state, voters were presented with the following language:
AMENDMENT # 4 In Alabama, the language was as follows:
Proposed Statewide Amendment Number 2: Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, to abolish the prohibition of interracial marriages.
The differences in language suggest that in South Carolina, despite (or perhaps because of) the added explanation, voters might have thought that they were being asked to approve rather than disapprove of the constitutional language banning miscegenation. In Alabama, however, voters faced a shorter and simpler proposition. Confusion among South Carolina voters would also explain the fact that blacks in that state were approximately three times as likely to vote "No" as blacks in Alabama. This suggests that voters with lower levels of education, a disproportionate number of whom are black, were more likely to be confused by the language of the South Carolina amendment. And it would be hard to explain otherwise.
This assumption is further borne out by evidence from a pre-election poll in Alabama. Respondents were asked the following question: "In the November general election, Alabama voters will decide whether to remove section 102 from the state constitution. The section reads as follows: 'The legislature shall never pass any law to authorize or legalize any marriage between any white person and a Negro or descendant of a Negro.' As currently worded, would you say this section prohibits interracial marriage in Alabama or not?" As Table 4 shows, most Alabamans understood the ballot language, though blacks were more likely to misunderstand it than whites. failings rather than social causes. This is simply implausible on its faces as an explanation of attitudes toward racial marriage, and so cannot be responsible for white opposition to it.
While the available data, being essentially quasi-experiment, do not provide a definitive explanation for this gap, these results do raise the possibility that the traditional racism that defined white attitudes prior to the civil rights era is not completely dead, as some have suggested (Kinder and Sanders 1996, pp. 92-98). It also raises the possibility (especially in light of the contrast with Krysan's findings above) that some racial attitudes are expressed in actions that are not admitted to, even in anonymous surveys.
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Some might also claim that opposition to these amendments might, in fact, reflect some form of the "new" racism, or at least something other than the "old" racism.
According to this claim, those whites who voted 'no' did so not because they actually supported miscegenation bans, but because they saw the referendum as an example of blacks' propensity for dredging up the past and of focusing on the perceived racism of whites. Although controversial, however, public expressions of this sort of "new racism"
are not uncommon in many debates on racial matters. Thus, one would expect that if the "new" racism underpinned much of the white opposition to the measure, at least some public figures would have articulated such arguments. Yet, as previously mentioned, opposition to the amendment was non-existent except for the most marginal elements.
Moreover, even if white voters were motivated by something other than the old racism, they still expressed those motivations through supporting a legal provision that is clearly a remnant of the old racism. That many chose to do so suggests that white racial behavior is more complex and dependent on context than many have previously thought.
Of course, the applicability of this behavior beyond southern states like South Carolina and Alabama is open to question. Support for anti-miscegenation laws was, and is, higher in this area than in the rest of the nation. As a result, if whites were reluctant to express their true racial sentiments, or if their attitudes were dependent on context in more complex ways, it would likely be more evident in this region. On the other hand, we can find no reason to predict that the existence of a differential between behavior in the polls and at the voting booth is unique to the South.
Conclusion
This large racial division in voting on these symbolic amendments stands in contradiction to received wisdom. At the same time, it emphasizes the importance of context in evaluating attitudes. The sizeable gap between the attitudes expressed in the voting booth and in surveys suggests that evaluations of racism and racial attitudes based on survey data could be substantively incomplete. As such, these results point to the desirability of incorporating information from other expressions of white attitudes in order to accurately gauge their depth and breadth. 20 We tested sensitivity to 1% uniform noise on the dependent and independent variables. 21 Note that the EI estimates that we discuss are the least favorable to our overall finding that white voting behavior and stated opinions significantly differ, thus our conclusions are robust across estimation methods. Note also that the standard errors for the EI method are generally significantly smaller than the range across methods reported in Table 1 . See Table 5 for the complete set of estimates and standard errors from all methods. 22 Based on EI 2-stage estimates, as reported in Table 5 . The proportion reported for Alabama is a linear population-weighted combination of the two separate EI point estimates for Jefferson county and for all other Alabama counties. 23 Roll-off and turnout were not unusual. In South Carolina, which had four amendments on the same ballot, overall roll-off ranged from 21% to 25% (weighted), with roll-off on amendment 4 being the least. See the Appendix for estimates of roll-off by race in each state. 24 This difference was both statistically and substantively neglible. We also compared voters and non-voters by region -the difference for SC was 8.2% and the difference for AL was -4.2%. However, both these regional subsamples are necessarily small, and we found (using bootstrap methods) the differences between voters and non voters in them not to be statistically significant either. 25 On the impact of age and education, see Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan (1997). On urbanization and "black threat," see Voss (1996, 2000) , and Hutchings & Valentino (2004) . 26 Although some relevant demographic data is available at the blockgroup level of aggregation, it is not generally possible to merge it cleanly with voting data, since voting precincts and blockgroup boundaries often overlap in complex ways. Thus, we were forced to use county-level aggregates. 27 Although this is, essentially, the only practical technique for estimating the relationship ecological effects in the presence of multiple covariates, some caution is warranted with this technique as it can be biased where the precinct bounds are insufficiently narrow. Following the recommendation of Adolph, King, Herron and Schotts (2003), we apply their diagnostic (as illustrated at pg 90) to determine whether EI-W is likely to be substantially unbiased in our analysis: Fortunately, our data provides tight enough bounds on w that both the EI-W regressions for SC and for the bulk of AL are well within the region of estimates expected to be "approximately unbiased". The diagnostic for Jefferson County is still within the "approximately unbiased" region, but near the edges of it, and more caution may be warranted with respect to it's EI-W analysis. 28 Technically, the urbanization variable was statistically significant, however we would caution against attaching any substantive meaning to this, given an estimated coefficient that was close to zero, and the poor model fit. 29 In addition, the independent variables presented in this table must be statistically interpreted as contextual effects. E.g., as the effect on an individual white voter of living in a county that has a higher proportion of minorities, in a county that has a higher proportion of rural area, or a county that contains a higher proportion of educated voters. They are not, e.g., unbiased predictors of the effect of being more educated on an individual white voter. (See Greenberg, et. al,1989 , for cautions on the latter interpretation.) 30 Duke received 55 percent of the white vote and virtually no black votes (Applebome 1991) . 31 In this respect, our research buttresses the findings of scholars like Keith Reeves, who show that white voters often mislead survey interviewers about their racial conservatism, particularly in pre-elections polls of campaigns involving with black candidates. (Reeves 1997) More generally, white voters, in the privacy of the voting booth have almost always expressed high levels of racial conservatism.
